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Abstract

In game theory, buyer-seller games rarely utilize a negotiating third
party. Any negotiations are typically conducted by the buyer and
seller. This study, motivated by the real estate market, uses sequentially and simultaneously played game models to explore the influence
a self-interested, negotiating, third party has on player payoffs. For
the sequential model, a game tree is utilized to demonstrate player
actions, preferences, and outcomes. The weak sequential equilibrium
is calculated using Gambit[1] and shows optimality in player payoffs
to exist when the seller’s and realtor’s strategies align according to the
current market. For the simultaneous model, expected payoff functions for each of the three players are constructed. PlatEMO[2], a
MATLAB extension, is used to simultaneously maximize the players’
functions using multi-objective optimization evolutionary algorithms.
The Pareto-optimal front is found, consisting of all non-dominated
solutions in the objective space. Similar to the sequential model, optimal outcomes exist when seller and realtor strategies align. Findings
from both models suggest a self-interested negotiating third party is
largely unnecessary and only has negative impact on player payoffs.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1

“What’s in a Game?”

Game theory is the study of mathematical models of strategic interaction among
rational decision-makers [7]. It has also been described as the mathematics of
conflicts of interest when trying to make optimal choices [8]. Essentially, it provides a way to mathematically model optimal outcomes based on the players’
preferences. These outcomes are dependent on the mutual actions of the players.
Applications include scenarios as simple as a group of friends trying to determine which movie to go see, to extremes such as two countries entering a trade
negotiation. In these scenarios, each player has a vested interest in the outcome
that is very likely conflicting with another player’s interest. Arriving at an outcome that is optimal, given the players’ conflicting interests, requires the use of
a game theoretic model. Gillman and Housman [9] formally define a game to
consist of the following:
Definition 1 A game consists of the following
1) A set N = {1, 2, ..., n} of at least 2 players
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2) A set O of possible outcomes that can occur when the game is played
3) Rules that state how the game is to be played
4) Defined preferences among the players involved in the game.
To build a game theoretic model, these four items must be identifiable. For
example, two friends, John and Mike, may be trying to decide what movie to go
see. There are three movies playing at their local theater: Movie A, Movie B,
and Movie C. John would rather see Movie A which is a sequel to his favorite
franchise and refuses to see Movie C due to his hatred of horror films. Mike, on
the other hand, would rather see Movie C since he has already seen the other two
movies playing, and Movie A is too long, given the amount of free time he has.
They definitely don’t want to see any of the movies playing by themselves, so
they must decide amongst themselves which movie they are going see together.
In this simple scenario we can identify the following:
1) Who are the players? In this scenario, the set of players is the 2 friends,
John and Mike.
2) What are the possible outcomes? The set of possible outcomes is the
set of all possible movies {Movie A, Movie B, Movie C} that are playing at
the theater.
3) What are the rules that govern the players’ actions? The players
must work cooperatively in order to determine which movie they are going
to see together. Seeing separate movies by themselves is not an option.
4) What preferences do the players have among the outcomes? John
prefers Movie A > Movie B > Movie C, due to Movie A being a sequel to
his favorite franchise and his hatred of horror films. Mike prefers Movie C
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> Movie B > Movie A, due to having already seen Movie A and Movie B
and his limited available free time.
The above scenario models a cooperative game 1 among two players with complete information 2 . Cooperative games allow for players to openly communicate
strategies and preferences among the outcomes with each other. This awareness
of the the opposing player’s strategies and preferences grants each player complete information of the type of game being played. More generally, a variety of
games can be constructed depending on factors such as how many players exist,
whether or not there is cooperative play, if the game consists of complete versus
incomplete information, if the game is being played singularly or iteratively, etc.
One of the most common types of games is a mixed-strategy game, in which a
player assigns a probability distribution to their available actions based on their
belief of the other player’s (or players’) actions. Optimality exists in a mixture
of strategy choices, based on a defined probability, for at least one of the players.
This is a common type of outcome in game theory since pure strategy solutions
are rarely seen in real-world interactions.

1.2

Buyer-Seller Games

A mixed-strategy game could also be used to describe buyer-seller interactions.
Buyer-seller games abound, using various architectures and applications [9, 10,
11, 12]. These games present an interaction usually between two players, one
being the seller and the other the buyer. Typically, one player (the seller) has an
item which they are willing to sell at a value greater than or equal to its loss. The
1

Cooperative games require players to arrive at a binding agreement regarding their actions

[9].
2

A player has complete information if they are aware of the rules of the game, the possible
outcomes, and all preferences held by every player [9].
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other player (the buyer) has a desire to purchase said item, but only at a price
which they are profiting, either monetarily or otherwise. Other factors, outside of
monetary gain, could influence player preferences as well. A scenario might exist
where a seller has multiple buyers looking to purchase the same item. In this
case, one buyer may be willing to pay more than his valuation of the item out
of fear that the seller will get a better offer from another player. Alternatively,
time may be a concern of the seller in that they are willing to take a reduced
offer to meet a specific deadline. Depending on the nature of the scenario, all
information is not always communicated between buyer and seller, indicating a
lack of complete or perfect information 1 in the game.
Bergemann and Heumann [10] pose an example of such a game involving a
seller who is privately informed of the value (v) of an item they are looking to
sell. A buyer believes the true value of this item lies somewhere on a uniformly
distributed interval [x, y] where 0 < x < y. Additionally, the item in question
is worth 32 v to the buyer. If the buyer proposes a price (p), the seller will either
accept if p ≥ v or reject if p < v. If the seller accepts, they will get a payoff of
p − v, and the buyer will get a payoff of 32 v − p. If the seller rejects the buyer’s
offer, the seller will get a payoff of v, since they are retaining the value of the
item, and the buyer will get a payoff of 0. By applying a game theoretic model,
an optimal offer for the buyer can be found in order to provide them with the
best possible payoff, with regards to the seller’s preferences [10].
As shown in the work by Bergemann and Heumann [10], interactions between
the seller and buyer may either occur simultaneously or sequentially depending
the on the scenario being studied. However, to illustrate the element of negotiation, buyer-seller games are more often played sequentially. This is especially
apparent when applying buyer-seller games to the real estate market. Typically,
1

Players choose their actions sequentially and know all actions taken previously [9].
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buyers and sellers negotiate using a series of offers and counter-offers, responding sequentially to the previous player’s action, until a mutually agreed upon
resolution is achieved.
In cases of a buyer-seller interaction with missing information, the buyer
and/or seller may be unaware of the other’s true valuation or strategy. This
lack of information between parties forces players to make decisions based off
of how they believe their opponent(s) to have acted prior to their information
set 1 ; however, a negotiator could be added to the game to whom information is
made freely available from both parties. This negotiator would also have a vested
interest in the outcome, as they would be looking to maximize a commission or
profit over time. In the real world, buyer-seller interactions are often mediated
by a third party with a vested interest. Such is the case with consignment shops,
online purchasing (i.e. eBay, Etsy, Amazon, etc.), and the real estate market.

1.3

The Real Estate Market

In the real estate market, sellers and buyers rarely interact directly with each
other. Instead, real estate agents are typically employed by both parties. While
the sale of a home can occur without the use of a negotiating party, a realtor usually acts on the behalf of the seller or buyer, mediating any buyer-seller interaction. Often the seller and buyer will have their own agents acting on their behalf,
but it is possible for a realtor to act as a dual agent between both parties. In this
case they would receive a double commission. This agent is tasked with pricing
the home for sale, marketing the home, negotiating the sale with the buyer or
buyer’s agent, and facilitating the sale through closing. These services are all covered in the realtor’s commission. Additionally, these agents promise a likelihood
1

An information set is a set that, for a particular player, establishes all the possible moves
that could have taken place in the game so far, given what that player has observed [13]
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in increased sales price with the employment of their services. While it can be
assumed that the realtor would have the client’s best interest at heart, the reality
is that the realtor views their client as a means off of which they can capitalize. This consideration of a third-party interest moves the two-player buyer-seller
game to a three-player buyer-seller-negotiator game containing both imperfect
and incomplete information, in which all three players act in self-interest.
Scenarios involving incomplete and imperfect information frequently occur.
For instance, a seller who is motivated might not want this communicated to a
potential buyer in effort to maximize their payoff. Additionally, a buyer may be
unaware of other offers received or if there is a reserve price when determining
how to bid for a property. Both of these scenarios would require an assignment of
a probability distribution either across previous actions taken by the other player
or across all possible game models.
Cao discusses the realtor as a third-party interest [14]. While a realtor may
be hired to protect the seller’s interest, they add another dimension to the game
as they enter with their own interest of personal gain. Cao identifies two selfpromoting strategies for the realtor. In the first, the realtor seeks to extend
market time exposure of the property in order to get the best possible offer, maximizing their commission. The realtor might communicate interest in maximizing
the seller’s profit, but this is likely to be only to the degree in which it directly
affects their commission. In the second strategy, Cao states that the realtor seeks
a quick turnover, even at the risk of a lower commission. This implies they may
undercut the seller’s potential profit in order to maximize their own profits over
time, allowing them to focus on other available listings and potential commissions. This calls to attention to the fact that seller and realtor priorities may not
always align [14].
A typical commission rate for an agent acting on behalf of both parties is

6
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between 5% and 6%, depending on the type of home to be listed and the type
of existing market [15]. However, this range may fluctuate between states and
agencies. This rate may also be negotiated between the agent and the client. If
the seller and buyer have separate agents, this commission is split evenly between
the two negotiating parties. Upon closing, the seller is usually responsible to pay
the full commission cost [15].
When considering player strategies in negotiation, Cao suggests the seller
maintains the upper hand by communicating a rejection threshold to the buyer
[14]. By announcing a rejection threshold, this informs and places an expectation
on the buyer, essentially eliminating consideration of offers below a particular
price point. Cao goes on to state that it is in the buyer’s best interest not to
inquire concerning rejected offers but rather to act according to their own optimal
strategy[14]. This is considering a game only between the two parties, where all
negotiations are handled without the implementation of a third party. However,
the same could be easily surmised when considering interactions between the
buyer and seller’s agent.

1.4

Context and Overview

When analyzing buyer-seller interactions using game theory, a negotiating thirdparty interest is rarely considered. Any negotiations are typically conducted by
the buyer and seller themselves. This study looks at the contributions a vested
third-party negotiator brings to a buyer-seller game and how they influence player
payoffs. Optimal strategies for the all players will be identified to determine at
what point equilibria can be is achieved.
Although it is typical for the buyer and seller to have separate realtors working
on their behalf, the seller’s realtor is considered the only negotiating party for the
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purpose of this study. This negotiating third party is assumed to have perfect
and complete information from both parties while remaining self-interested. This
introduces a different approach to typical buyer-seller games, in which the two
parties may be unaware of the other’s motivations.
Buyer-seller models introduced in this paper explicitly focus on player interactions in the real estate market. Two models, an “extensive game” and a “Bayesian
game”, involving a third-party negotiating interest in a buyer-seller game are examined in which both incomplete and imperfect information are present. Incomplete information exists in the “extensive game” model, and imperfect information
exists in the “Bayesian game” model.

1.4.1

Extensive Game Theoretic Model

The “extensive game” model implements a 50/50 chance between a buyer’s and
seller’s market. This model deals with a single buyer, seller, and realtor and
focuses on outcomes involving alignment and misalignment between the seller’s
and realtor’s strategies and the impact this has on the players’ payoffs. As buyerseller interactions tend to be sequential, this model allows for visual representation
of the sequential play and accounts for player belief systems 1 based on previous
strategies. A game tree is constructed, showing all player behavior strategies 2 ,
belief systems, and outcomes. All weak sequential equilibria, solutions that are
sequentially rational 3 and demonstrate consistency of beliefs 4 among the players,
are identified.
1

A belief systems is a function that assigns a probability distribution over histories in each
information set not assigned to chance [9].
2
A behavior strategy is a function which assigns to each of the player’s information sets a
probability distribution over possible actions [9]
3
A sequentially rational solution requires all player strategies to be a best response at each
information set to which either the player or chance is assigned [9]
4
Consistency of beliefs is held when a player’s belief system matches that of the previously
acting player’s strategy profile [9].
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1.4.2

Bayesian Model

The “Bayesian game” model deals with a single buyer, seller, and realtor but
considers the existence of different types of the negotiating party. Two types of
realtor interest are considered: a realtor who desires to maximize their commission
and a realtor looking for a quick sale, as these are the two dominating interests of
a negotiating third party in the real estate market. Variables such as the agreed
upon list price between the seller and negotiator, commission rate selection by the
negotiator, and the buyer’s offer price are analyzed to determine where optimal
payoffs occur. Expected payoff functions for each player are constructed using
these variables. Parallel processing of the player’s expected payoffs using a nondominated 1 sorting genetic algorithm is then utilized to find the Pareto-optimal
front 2 of the simultaneously maximized player functions using PlatEMO [2] in
MATLAB [16]. The Pareto-optimal front is then identified to determine the set
of non-dominated solutions that exist for each of the players and how payoffs are
influenced by the realtor.

1

A solution is called non-dominated if none of the objective functions can be improved in
value without degrading some of the other objective values.
2
A Pareto-optimal front is a collection of all non-dominated points within the objective
space
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Chapter 2
Model Architecture
2.1

Case I: Extensive Game

In sequential games, consideration must be given to the player’s knowledge of
previous actions at each non-terminal history 1 as well as their knowledge of the
type of game they are playing (i.e. the rules, outcomes, and preferences). When
a player possesses knowledge of all previous actions, the player is said to have
perfect information, and when the player is aware of all rules outcomes, and player
preferences, the player is said to have complete information. Games in which
players take action sequentially with incomplete and/or imperfect information are
known as extensive games. Gillman and Housman [9] formally define extensive
games as consisting of the following:

Definition 2 An extensive game consists of the following
1) A set N = {1, 2, ..., n} of at least two players

1

A non-terminal history marks a subsequence of play that is made along the way before
reaching the end of the game [9].

10

2.1 Case I: Extensive Game

2) A set O of terminal histories 1
3) Information sets partitioning all non-terminal histories such that each
non-terminal history within an information set has the same set of possible actions following it.
4) A player or chance is assigned to each information set.
5) For each information set assigned to chance, there is a probability distribution that chance uses to select its action.
6) Starting with the empty history 2 , if a non-terminal history is reached,
the assigned player, or chance, selects an action to append to the current
history.
7) Utility functions ui : O −→ R that specify preferences among terminal
histories for each player i ∈ N
Sequential games, like the extensive model presented in this text, are typically
represented using a game tree 3 . The tree’s root node, also called the empty
history, indicates the starting point of the game. Edges branching from nodes
represent actions either assigned to players or chance. Nodes within the game are
non-terminal histories and represent player sequences within the game. Terminal
nodes are labeled with outcomes/payoffs for their particular sequence of actions
[9].
1

A terminal history marks the ending sequence of a sequential game.
An empty history marks the starting sequence of a sequential game.
3
A game tree provides a visual representation of a sequential game and displays all ways
2

that a game could be played.
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Figure 2.1: Sequence of play for all players in the extensive model along
with their available actions at each turn (abbreviations correspond to
actions in Figure 2.2)

2.1.1

Building the Game Tree

We construct a three-player extensive model involving a single seller, buyer, and
realtor; all of whom are looking to maximize their payoff. Chance is implemented
as the root node with a 50/50 probability of either being a buyer’s market or
a seller’s market. A buyer’s market suggests an oversaturation of homes on the
market, allowing the buyer a greater likelihood of acceptance of a reduced offer.
A seller’s market suggests a dearth of homes on the market, allowing the seller
a greater likelihood of achieving an increased sales price. As with any modeling
process, several assumptions will be made in regards to the players and their
actions.
Assumption 1. The type of market is directly related to the seller’s motivation (i.e. A buyer’s market indicates the seller is motivated while a
seller’s market indicates the seller is indifferent).
Following declaration of the market, all players are aware of the current market
and can choose to act accordingly. The realtor takes action first, choosing either
to list the property high in effort to maximize their commission (H), extending
its market time, or list the property low (L), reducing its market time.

12
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Assumption 2. The realtor action (H) implies that the property is listed
at the high end of fair market 1 ; alternatively, (L) implies the property is is
listed at the low end of fair market.
Assumption 3. The realtor action (H) implies an increase in time on the
market for a potentially larger purchase price, while (L) is a decrease in
time on the market for a potentially smaller purchase price.
The buyer’s action follows in which they must decide to make an offer for the
property at the asking price (A), submit a counter offer reasonable for the current
market (C), or refuse to even bid the property and walk away (W). If the buyer
chooses to submit a counter offer, the action sequence then goes to the realtor;
otherwise, the game ends.
Assumption 4. The buyer action (C) implies a reduced offer, typical for
the current market, is made.
At this point in the game, the buyer, although aware of the current market, has
imperfect information regarding the realtor’s previous action. They are unaware if
the realtor has listed the property at an inflated price to increase their commission
(H) or if the listing price has been reduced to facilitate a quick sale (L). Thus, a
belief system must be implemented, due to the information set consisting of two
possible node locations within the game.
The realtor’s second action sequence requires them to either encourage the
seller to accept the counter offer (E), indicating the counter offer still affords a
reasonable commission, or discourage acceptance of the offer (D), indicating the
contrary.
1

For this study, fair market will be defined as the interval [x, y] on which market value
exists.
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Assumption 5. In regards to the realtor action (H), the follow-up action
(E) indicates the realtor is still within their desired commission range, while
(D) indicates the realtor’s commission would significantly drop.
Assumption 6. In regards to the realtor action (L), the follow-up action
(E) indicates the realtor values time saved over a reduced commission, while
(D) indicates the time saved is not worth the reduced commission.
The seller takes actions last, and only if a counter offer is presented. In such a
scenario, the seller must either accept the reduced offer (A) or reject the offer
(R) on the basis of their motivation. Imperfect information exists at this player
sequence as well. For each market, two separate information sets exist for the
seller. While the seller is aware of the realtor’s second action (E) or (D), he is
unaware of the realtor’s initial action (H) or (L); therefore, both terminal histories
following (E) make up one information set and both terminal histories following
(D) make up the other. Similar to the buyer, the seller must implement a belief
system based on how he believes the realtor is acting in the game - looking to
maximize his commission or looking for a quick turnover.
Players are concerned with a variety of factors, depending on where their
action point is within the game. For instance, in a buyer’s market where there
is an oversaturation of houses on the market, the seller would place primary
importance on reducing market time and secondary importance on achieving
their valuation. Alternatively, in a seller’s market where demand exceeds supply,
the seller is likely to be indifferent about time, placing all importance solely on
their return value.
Assumption 7. A motivated seller places most importance on time and
secondary importance on purchase price; conversely, an indifferent seller
place most importance on purchase price and are unconcerned with time.
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P 1 −→ Seller
P 2 −→ Realtor
P 3 −→ Buyer

(5, 5, −10)
A
C

E

P 12

P 22

P 31

(2, 3, −5)

D

(−10, −10, 0)

A

(3, 0, 0)

D

(−10, −7, 0)

D

W

H

A

(−5, −5, 0)

P 11

P 21
(10, 10, 6)
L

A
P 31

C

P 12

A

(8, 8, 8)

D

(−5, −8, 0)

E
P 23

Buyer’s Market
P 11

D

W

(−2, −2, 0)

A

(6, 6, 10)

D

(−5, −6, 0)

Chance ( 12 / 12 )
(10, 10, −10)
A
C

Seller’s Market

E

P 14

P 25

P 32

(8, 8, −5)

D

(0, −2, 0)

A

(6, 6, 0)

D

(0, 0, 0)

D

W

H

A

(0, 0, 0)

P 13

P 24
(−6, 5, 6)
L

A
P 32

C

P 14

A

(−8, 3, 8)

D

(0, −10, 0)

E
P 26

D

W

(0, −5, 0)

P 13

A

(−10, 0, 10)

D

(0, −7, 0)

Figure 2.2: Extensive model game tree showing sequence of play, player
actions (e.g. H, L, A,...), information sets (e.g. P 11 ,..., P 21 ,...,P 31 ,...),
and payoffs (#,#,#).
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non-terminal history
terminal history
imperfect information set
decision path
weak sequential equilibrium path
Figure 2.3: Technical legend for Figure 2.2

A buyer is only ever concerned with receiving the best possible deal, regardless
of the type of market they are in.
Assumption 8. The buyer’s valuation is synonymous with market value.
Assumption 9. Market value is the midpoint on the fair market interval.
The realtor, however, must have a variety of considerations, depending on
where they are looking to make a decision. At information set P 21 , the realtor
must decide to either go for a higher (H) or lower (L) commission, corresponding
to an extended market time or a quick sale, respectively. Since this information
set is in a buyer’s market, to act in the seller’s best interest would mean that the
realtor would need to consider time to be of most importance, therefore choosing
(L). Choosing this option, the realtor’s payoff would have three considerations:
time saved, commission received, and the possibility of the client being retained
for future services. If action (H) was selected by the realtor at information set
P 21 , time would be of no concern and the payoff would only have two considerations, the commission received as well as the possible loss of a future/current
client. At information set P 24 the realtor’s decision exists in a seller’s market.
To choose (H) would place primary importance on obtaining a larger commission,
which is directly related to the sales price. Seeing how the seller is indifferent
about time and is only concerned with obtaining the largest return value as possi-
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ble, the realtor’s payoff takes into consideration the commission received as well as
the possibility of the client being retained for future services. However, to choose
(L), would again result in three considerations to the realtor’s payoff: time saved,
commission received, and the possible loss of a future/current client.

Payoffs in Figure 2.2 are calculated using previously stated considerations
as if players had perfect information as to how the game was played. Player
payoffs exist on the interval [−10, 10], where −10 indicates the worst possible
outcome for a player, 0 indicates the player gains/loses nothing in regards to the
considerations associated with that outcome, and 10 indicates the best possible
outcome for a player. All other payoff values are a sum of gains and loses in
regards to considerations they hold at that particular outcome.
For example, at the terminal history “Buyer’s Market, H, A”, a buyer’s market
is selected, the realtor chooses to list the property high for a larger commission,
and the buyer puts in an offer at the asking price. The assigned player payoffs
here are (5, 5, −10). Here the seller gets a reduced payoff of 5, due to market time
being extended, per the realtor’s actions, while they are motivated to sell. It is
important to remember that in a buyer’s market the seller values reduced market
time more than an increased sales price. Even with this being the case, they
attain a payoff greater than 0 since they are obtaining a sale price significantly
over market value, although still within fair market. The realtor also receives
a reduced payoff of 5, due to their loss of potentially retaining a future client
because of misalignment in strategy choice. However, a payoff greater than 0 is
assigned since they are obtaining a significantly larger commission. The buyer
receives the worst possible payoff, −10, since they are paying significantly over
market value in a market where the seller is motivated.
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2.1.2

Calculating the Weak Sequential Equilibrium

To calculate the weak sequential equilibrium, the game tree form Figure 2.2 is
constructed in Gambit1 [1]. Once the game is initiated in the GUI, sequentially rational behavior identified and consistency of beliefs are implemented. The output
defines the weak sequential equilibrium for the game and calculates the players’
expected payoffs.
Each best response action for all players at every non-terminal history are
identified and the edge labeled with their appropriate action is highlighted. These
highlighted actions demonstrate sequential rational behavior for the player with
whom the action is associated. For instance, when looking at any one of the
seller’s non-terminal histories in the buyer’s market subgame 2 (see Figure 2.2), it is
apparent that they will always get a better payoff by selecting (A) for acceptance
of the offer rather than selecting (D) to decline the offer. This makes sense since
in a buyer’s market it is assumed that the seller is motivated and willing to take
a loss in monetary gain for the sake of time. Therefore, we could say that, within
the buyer’s market subgame, the seller’s strategy to decline is dominated by their
strategy to accept.
A belief system is incorporated at information sets P 31 , P 32 , P 11 , P 12 , P 13 ,
and P 14 . Each belief system is assigned based on how the deciding player believes
the previous player to have acted based on the information known. Consistency
of beliefs is demonstrated at each information set based on how the acting player
believes the other to have acted. For example, at information set P 32 , the buyer
must decide whether to take the property as asking, submit a counter offer, or
walk away. The buyer is aware that a seller’s market exists, but they are unaware
1

Gambit is an open-source collection of tools for doing computation in game theory.
A subgame G(h) of the sequential game G, beginning at the non-terminal history h, consists
of the players in the game, any terminal histories for which h is its initial party, and the player
function and preferences inherited from the full game. The game G is a subgame of itself, and
there is a proper subgame for each non-terminal history of the game [9].
2
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if the property was listed high, to increase the realtor’s commission, or low, for a
quick sale. While they can achieve a payoff of 6 by taking the property at asking
if a low list price was submitted, they can receive a payoff of −10 if a high list
price was submitted. From their knowledge of the seller’s market, it is in their
best interest to walk away due to their belief that the realtor would list high in
such a market. This assigns them a payoff of 0 rather than −10 or, potentially,
−5. Seeing as the buyer’s belief system matches that of the realtor’s strategy at
P 24 , consistency of beliefs has been established.
The weak sequential equilibria is stated using an assessment of the players’
strategy profiles (s) as well as their beliefs (β). Strategy profiles reflect sequentially ration behavior for the players at each of their information sets, while
beliefs reflect a consistency of beliefs as to how each player believes the opposing
player(s), for which they have imperfect information, to have acted. The following is the assessment for the weak sequential equilibrium derived from this game
model.
(s, β) = ((sSeller , sRealtor , sBuyer ), (βSeller , βBuyer ))
where
sSeller = (s(P 11 ), s(P 12 ), s(P 13 ), s(P 14 )) = (A, A, A, A)
sRealtor = (s(P 21 ), s(P 22 ), s(P 23 ), s(P 24 ), s(P 25 ), s(P 26 )) = (L, E, E, H, E, E)
sBuyer = (s(P 31 ), s(P 32 )) = (C, W )
βSeller = (β(P 11 ), β(P 12 ), β(P 13 ), β(P 14 )) = (L, L, H, H)
βBuyer = (β(P 31 ), β(P 32 )) = (L, H)
As defined by the assessment above, the expected player payoffs based on the
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weak sequential equilibrium is
1
1
1
1
(A; L, E; C) + (A; H, E; W ) = (8, 8, 8) + (0, 0, 0) = (4, 4, 4).
2
2
2
2

2.1.3

(2.1)

Interpreting the Equilibrium

This interprets such that, if in a buyer’s market, the realtor should focus on
listing the property for quick sale. The buyer, aware of the current market,
should counter under the assumption that the seller is motivated. Under the
assumption that a reasonable counter has been made within the range of fair
market, the realtor should, in turn, encourage the seller to accept the offer as this
would allow him to received a reduced commission but as quickly as possible. The
seller, who is motivated under the current market, should accept the reduced offer.
If in a seller’s market, the realtor should extend market exposure by listing
the the property at the higher end of fair market, in order to receive the highest
possible commission. Accordingly, a rational buyer, strictly looking at monetary
gain, should walk away from the offer. In such a scenario the seller would not
even get a chance to act.
It isn’t trivial to point out that the realtor, as a negotiating third party with
vested interest, maximizes their profit when aligning their strategy with that of
the seller. This means in a buyer’s market, the realtor should place higher priority
reducing market time rather than extending market exposure to possibly attain
a higher commission. In a seller’s market, where the seller is indifferent about
selling unless presented with a substantial offer, the realtor should be unconcerned
with time and extend market exposure in maximize their commission. As can be
seen in Figure 2.2, when the realtor and seller strategies align, payoffs dominate
outcomes with misalignment.

20

2.2 Case II: Bayesian Game

2.2

Case II: Bayesian Game

Bayesian games look not only at the number of players but also at potential types
of each player as well. This introduces incomplete information into the game, as
players are unaware of the type of players they are facing and must incorporate
a probability distribution over all possible types. This provides a more realistic
approach to buyer-seller behavior as the market isn’t always indicative of how a
player values a property. In the extensive game, it was assumed that a buyer’s
market was indicative of a motivated seller while a seller’s market was indicative
of an indifferent seller. Since players were aware of the current market, they
could rightfully assume the actions of their opponent(s), this of course being if
the realtor aligned their strategy with that of the seller. Bayesian games make no
such assumptions. Therefore, this removes the need for consideration of the type
of market all together. Rather, player values exist on intervals, where conditionals
dictate player payoffs. Gillman and Housman [9] formally define Bayesian games
as consisting of the following:
Definition 3 A Bayesian game consists of the following
1) A set N = {1, 2, ..., n} of at least 2 players.
2) A set Ti of types for each player i such that T = T1 × T2 × ... × Tn is
the set of type profiles known as the type space.
3) A set Ai of actions available to players i for each i ∈ N .
4) A set of outcomes O = A = A1 × A2 × ... × An that occur when typed
players choose their actions according to their type profiles
5) Belief functions φi where φi (t−i |ti ) is the probability that the other
player types come from the type profile t−i given that player i has type
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ti . The function φi is a probability distribution on the truncated type
space T−i = T1 × T2 × Ti−1 × Ti+1 × ... × Tn . (The notation t−i ∈ T−i
indicates a type profile with ti removed.)
6) A rule stating that players simultaneously choose actions after privately
learning their own types.
7) Utility functions ui where ui (a|ti ) is the cardinal utility player i of type
ti ascribes to outcome a, for each player i.
While we are neglecting to consider the type of market, several assumptions
will still need to be considered in determining exactly what market value value is
and the player’s perception of that value. The following assumptions are retained
from the extensive model:
Assumption 1. The buyer’s valuation is synonymous with market value.
Assumption 2. Market value is the midpoint on the fair market interval.
In addition, the following assumptions will be made in regards to the market:
Assumption 3: Market value accounts for location, school district, recreational facilities, and other such amenities.
Assumption 4: The seller values the property at precisely market value.
Although real estate, as much as any other type of good to be sold, can elicit
emotional and irrational behavior from both buyer or seller, it is important to
remember that game theory only considers rational decision making. The best
way this can be represented is by calculating players payoffs solely through gains
or losses of monetary value.
Assumption 5: The seller and buyer are strictly motivated by monetary
gain.
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Using what we know about about the market and how players perceive it, we can
define the expected payoff utilities for each of the players.

2.2.1

Defining the Players’ Utilities

When defining the player utility functions, consideration must be given to when
an offer would be accepted or otherwise. To maintain rationality in this decision, a
reserve price (p) will be introduced to the the model. This strategy, while selected
by the seller, is strategically influenced by the realtor in attempt to achieve their
preferred outcome: a maximized commission as a result of a maximized sale price,
a reduced commission as a result of a quick sale. Additionally, this allows the
seller to, potentially, maximize their sale price while also rejecting all other offers
below that threshold. It is important to note that this value can be above, below,
or directly at market value, based on the the seller’s and realtor’s motivation. The
seller still values the property at market value. In the event that the seller sets a
reserve price below market value (m) this would indicate the seller, motivated by
factors not accounted for in this model, is willing to take a negative payoff. This
must be understood in order for rational play to be considered consistent.
Assumption 6: The seller’s reserve price p of the property is a privately
known, realtor-influenced, lowest acceptable offer price.
2.2.1.1

Seller’s Utility Function


1
1
ES = P r{v ≥ p} ∗ E (v − m − cL ) + (v − m − cH ) + P r{v < p} ∗ E[m] (2.2)
2
2
The seller’s utility function is defined by the buyer’s offer (v), the current

market value (m), and whether or not they are dealing with a realtor seeking a
high commission (cH ) or low commission (cL ). This utility function is inclusive of
the seller’s payoff under acceptance and rejection of the buyer’s offer. A probabil-
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ity of acceptance (P r{v ≥ p}) is assigned for conditions under which the buyer’s
offer is at least equal to or greater than the seller’s reserve price. Under this
condition, the expected payoff (E) is buyer’s offer minus the minus the market
value and the realtor’s commission. A sum of the payoffs, given the likelihood of
the two types of realtors, is included in the utility. In the event that the v ≤ m
the seller would receive a negative payoff under the accepted conditional. The
buyer’s offer must be greater than market value by an amount equal to that of
the realtor’s commission in order for the seller to simply break even. In the event
that the buyer’s offer is less than the seller’s reserve price (P r{v < p}), the seller
would receive an expected payoff of the market value, since they retain the value
of their property.
2.2.1.2

Buyer’s Utility Function
EB = P r{v ≥ p} ∗ E[(m − v)] + P r{v < p} ∗ E[0]

(2.3)

The buyer’s strategy is defined by the variable v. Similar to the seller’s reserve
price, the buyer’s offer may be greater than, less than, or equal to market value.
This strategy is representative of how motivated the buyer is to purchase the
property in question. Since each payoff is defined by monetary gain to the player,
the expected payoff to the buyer (E), under the condition that the offer is accepted
(P r{v ≥ p}), is calculated by finding the difference between market value and
the buyer’s offer. A negative payoff to the buyer would occur if their strategy
causes them to exceeds market value. While this may seem irrational on the part
of the buyer, their motivation to exceed market value might indicate a seller’s
market with a higher reserve price. A scenario in which the buyer always values
the property at market value but uses v as a strategy to achieve the best deal
possible could be explored in future study but will not be analyzed in this model.
If the buyer’s offer fails to at least meet seller’s reserve price (P r{v < p}), they
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would receive a payoff of 0, since there is no monetary gain or loss.
2.2.1.3

Realtor’s Utility Function


1
1
ER = P r{v ≥ p} ∗ E cL (v) + cH (v) + P r{v < p} ∗ E[0]
2
2

(2.4)

The realtor’s strategy is in selection of their commission rate. A realtor looking to maximize their commission would would select cH while a realtor more
concerned with making a quick sale would likely select cL . This presents the realtor with two different types in their type space. A belief function, φi , is applied
as a probability distribution over the type space. In the case of the realtor’s
utility function a 50/50 probability has been applied to either of the realtor’s
types. Their expected payoff, under the condition that the buyer’s offer is accepted (P r{v ≥ p}), is the sum of their selected commission rate multiplied by
the buyer’s offer over the type space. If the buyer fails to submit an acceptable
offer (P r{v < p}), the realtor would receive an expected payoff of 0, since they
gain nothing but likely retain their client for future offers.
Player utilities are composed as the sum of two separate expected payoffs
under opposing probability conditions - (P r{v ≥ p}) and (P r{v < p}). Since v
and p are independent of each other, as neither player is aware of the opposing
player’s strategy/offer before the onset, a probability of

1
2

has been assigned to

each. The player utilities can be further reduced to the following:
1
mL + mH
cL (v) + cH (v)
1 mL + mH
ES = (v −
−
)+ (
)
2
2
2
2
2

(2.5)

1 mL + mH
1
EB = (
− v) + (0)
2
2
2

(2.6)

1 cL (v) + cH (v)
1
) + (0)
ER = (
2
2
2

(2.7)
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where
p, v ∈ [mL , mH ],

cL , cH ∈ [0.05, 0.06]

The realtor’s commission, cL and cH , exists on separate intervals where the
values of the max and min on the bounded interval are typical across various
market climates. For the purpose of this study, the bounded interval for cL
will be defined as [0.05, 0.055] and the bounded interval for cH will defined as
[0.055, 0.06]. Random selection across these intervals is uniformly distributed for
both types of realtor. Since counter negotiating is not being considered in this
model, the realtor’s payoff is consequentially assigned according to the selected
commission of the final sale price as opposed to the selected list price, as seen in
the previous model.
Fair market is now defined as the interval [mL , mH ], where mL is the lower
bound of fair market and mH is the upper bound. The seller’s reserve price
and the buyer’s offer both exist on this interval. Also, market value, previously
defined as the midpoint of fair market, has been rewritten in terms of the interval
as (mL + mH )/2.

2.2.2

Simultaneously Played Games

As game theory looks to maximize payoffs for players of conflicting interest, this
may happen through sequential or simultaneous play. In simultaneous games,
players select their strategy independently from each other. After all players
select their strategy the game is initiated and everyone plays at once. Payoffs
are then assigned according to a defined utility function. Since our model has
three utility functions (ES , EB , ER ), we maximize them simultaneously in order
to achieve optimality. Multi-objective optimization is incorporated, where each
player’s payoff function is an objective function to be maximized. The next
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chapter expands on these methods to calculate optimal payoffs for each of the
players using evolutionary multi-objective optimization.
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Chapter 3
Methodology
3.1

Mulit-Objective Optimization

A multi-objective optimization problem (MOOP) looks at multiple functions in
which the goal is either to maximize or minimize each function simultaneously.
Each function is composed of variables, known as decision variables, and constraints that directly impact the outcome. The space in which all possible values
for the decision variables exist is known as the decision space. Constraints on the
decision variables will have an effect on the size and shape of the decision space.
The number of decision variables across the objective functions determines the
dimensionality of the decision space. Multi-objective optimization maps reference points within the decision space to a separate space defined by the objective
functions known as objective space. Similar to the decision space, the number
of objective functions determines the dimensionality of the objective space. Dimensionality between the decision and objective spaces need not be uniform. To
generalize, multi-objective optimization is a mapping between an n-dimensional
solution vector and an M -dimensional objective vector [4]. An illustration of this
idea can be seen in Figure 3.1.
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Figure 3.1: Schematic of multi-objective mapping. The performance
of any given parameter set is mapped into an objective space using a
ranking function which quantifies the quality of the parameters. This
image has been reproduced from Bassen et al [3].
Once the objective space has been composed of the specified population of
reference points from the decision space, a Pareto-optimal solution 1 is found. In
MOOPs, there is no singular solution, but rather a set of solutions dependent on
whether the objective functions are looking to be maximized or minimized. This
set of possible solutions is known as the Pareto-optimal front. Within the Paretooptimal front sits all possible non-dominated values that meet the conditions of
the system of objective functions. The Pareto-optimal front is defined by the
reference points that sit on that edge of the objective space. Inferences can be
made as to what the true Pareto-optimal front looks like based on the population
of reference points. The illustration above (Figure 3.1) maps a Pareto-optimal
front for which the objective functions are being minimized.
A common MOOP considers decision-making during the car-buying process.
A buyer might consider a variety of factors when looking to buy a car; two of
which could be the cost and comfort of the vehicle. For this example, it is safe
1

A Pareto-optimal solution is a solution where a trade-off exists between values such that
no value in the solution can be increased/decreased without decreasing/increasing another [4].
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Figure 3.2: Trade-off solutions for an illustrated car-buying
multi-objective problem [4].
to assume that an inexpensive car is less comfortable than an expensive one (see
Figure 3.3). If the buyer’s only objective is to reduce the cost as much as possible,
then solution A would be the optimal choice. Alternatively, if the buyer is only
concerned with maximizing the comfort of the vehicle, then solution E would be
the optimal choice. In either scenario, the buyer holds a single objective which
affords them a singular solution. However, if the buyer is looking to maximize
the comfort while minimizing the cost, this presents an MOOP. The curved line
in Figure 3.3 represents the Pareto-optimal front, and the points on that curve
represent Pareto-optimal solutions. In our case, each dot represents a different
vehicle the buyer might consider given their objectives. Each one of these points
on the Pareto front are non-dominated, meaning there is a trade-off between cost
and comfort as you move across the curve. Moving from one point to the next
will increase one of the objectives while decreasing the other. Therefore, A, B,
C, D, and E are all considered to be solutions to the MOOP [4].
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3.1.1

Evolutionary Algorithms

Evolutionary algorithms (EA) are a computational, heuristic-based approach to
solving MOOPs. The basis of how these algorithms work is rooted in biological
evolution, particularly natural selection [5]. In an EA, ideal members will survive
and proliferate, while unfit members will die off, failing to contribute to the gene
pool of further generations. This happens through a four-stage iterative process
of initialization, selection, genetic operators, and termination.

Figure 3.3: Natural selection process for evolutionary algorithms [5].

3.1.1.1

Initialization

In this first stage, a population of randomly generated members will be selected
from the decision space. The size of the population will determine the number of
possible solutions in the output. This could also be thought of as the number of
reference points to populate the Pareto-optimal front. While population selection
is random, a distribution could be applied to the selection, whether that be
uniform, beta, etc [5].
3.1.1.2

Selection

During selection, the each member of the population is evaluated according to
the objective functions in the MOOP. Non-dominated solutions are identified as
part of the Pareto-optimal front. These members form the bound for all other
dominated solutions [5].
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3.1.1.3

Genetic Operators

Since the goal is to populate the Pareto-front with the entire population, genetic
operators are applied to output of the selection process. In the crossover operator,
the top, most well-fit, members are selected as a parent population. The size
of this parent population can differ based on the EA being used. This new
parent population determines the next generation of the algorithm by selecting a
offspring population based on the genetic information its current members. The
members of the offspring population has a mixture of the genetic qualities the
parent population possesses [5].
Next, a mutation is applied across the new offspring population to ensure
they no longer perfectly mirror the genetic subsets of the parent population.
This prevents the optimized output from being stuck in a local extrema, failing
to show true optimality in the results. Typically, the chance of the offspring
receiving the mutation as well as the intensity of the mutation is determined by
a probability distribution [5].
3.1.1.4

Termination

The final stage of the evaluation process occurs under one of two conditions. 1)
The specified number of generations is reached. 2) The threshold of performance
is reached. When either of these conditions occur, the process terminates, and
the output is provided [5].

3.1.2

Evolutionary Multi-objective Optimization (EMO)

This study uses evolutionary algorithms that emphasize non-dominated solution
sets, as game theory particularly looks at non-dominated outcomes. If P is to be
the set of all feasible values in objective space, then P 0 is the subset of all non-
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dominated solutions, also referred to as the Pareto-optimal set. Evolutionary
algorithms are able to find these non-dominated solutions efficiently across a
variety of objective spaces, including those that might be discontinuous or concave
[4].
A multi-objective evolutionary algorithm (MOEA) typically uses one of two
methods to find a Pareto-optimal front. The first method looks to find the best
non-dominated solutions for a population. Once each member of the population
are mapped into the objective space, they are individually compared with one
another to determine dominance. If a member is non-dominated then it is added
to the subset P 0 . This process is continued until all members have been compared
with each other, and P 0 is solely comprised of non-dominated solutions [4].
The second method takes a somewhat different approach to the previous
method, assigning members of the population to different levels of dominance.
Rather than isolating non-dominated solutions from all other members of the
objective space, all members are assigned to one of potentially many fronts. The
process is continued across all members of the population until no members are
left without an assigned front. The number of levels is determined by the spread

Figure 3.4: Sorting of population members into non-dominated
fronts based on levels of dominance [4]
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and shape of the population in objective space. Those solutions populating the
Level 1 front are considered to be most dominant, while subsequent levels are less
dominant (see Figure 3.4). Once a member is sorted into its appropriate nondominated level, it is never visited again, reducing the computational complexity
that is required for the first method [4].
3.1.2.1

NSGA-II

One very popular MOEA that utilizes a non-dominated sorting method is NSGAII (non-dominated sorting genetic algorithm-II). A schematic of how this algorithm works can be seen in Figure 3.5. To start, an offspring population is
generated using genetic operators on the parent population (N ), such that the
combined population of parent and offspring is equal to twice the size of the original parent population (2N ) [17]. Non-dominated sorting assigns every member
of the population to a front based on each member’s overall dominance. Since
the new generation’s population needs to be the same size as the original parent
population, members are selected starting with Front 1 and moving to subsequent
fronts until a front must be split in order to fill the remainder of the new generation. At this point a crowding distance 1 metric is utilized to determine what
members of that specific front are best. Crowding distance is calculated using
the following formula [18]:
CDim =

fm (xi+1 ) − fm (xi−1 )
, i = 2, ..., (l − 1)
fm (xmax ) − fm (xmin )

(3.1)

In the formula above fm is the objective function, xi is the reference point, xi+1
and xi−1 are the two neighboring solutions, xmax and xmin are the maximum and
minimum values in the population, and l is the size of the population. Boundary
members on the front are assigned a crowding distance of ∞, since they don’t
1

Crowding distance calculates the average distance of a member’s two neighboring solutions.
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have neighboring solutions on either side. The crowding distance for all members
between the boundary points is calculated using the metric given above. Fro each
objective functions, the outputs of the two neighboring solutions are subtracted
and then divided by the difference in the outputs of the minimum and maximum
values in the population. This, in a sence, normalizes the calculated distance.
The crowding distance for each member on the front is then added across all
objective functions.
CDi =

M
X

CDim

(3.2)

m=1

Those members with the larger crowding distance are selected to be a part of the
next generation. This allows for greater exploration of the objective space [18].
All remaining members of the split front and all succeeding fronts are then
removed from the gene pool. This entire process comprises the construction of one
new generation of the parent population. Through programs, such as PlatEMO,
NSGA-II can be run for hundreds, even thousands, of generations in just a short
period of time, each new generation providing a more accurate representation of
the Pareto optimality.

Figure 3.5: Schematic of the NSGA-II procedure. This image has
been reproduced from Mittal and Deb [6].
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3.2
3.2.1

Implementation
Tools

The objective functions for each of the players were coded and run in a MATLABbased evolutionary multi-objective optimization platform extension known as
PlatEMO [2]. Developed in 2017, this platform allows for users to run and test
several different multi-objective problems using a variety of evolutionary algorithms such as NSGA-II, NSGA-III, SPEA2, -MOEA, etc. While other MOEA
libraries do exist, PlatEMO is unique in that it offers users a GUI for ease of
access and output comparison between algorithms. PlatEMO is also easily extensible, allowing users to code in and use their own MOOP and algorithms, all
of which is full developed in the MATLAB language.

Figure 3.6: GUI for the test module of PlatEMO
Within the interface, the user defines the problem to be solve and selects the
algorithm to apply. Next, the population size (N), number of objective functions
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in the problem (M), number of decision variables (D), and maximum number of
fitness evaluations must be specified. Once all parameters are selected, the user
must simply initiate by clicking the play button at the bottom of the GUI. A
graphical animation can be seen as the MOOP is run through the algorithm over
the specified evaluations.

3.2.2

Coding the Problem

Using the PlatEMO extension in MATLAB, a new MOOP labeled BSN1 (i.e.
Buyer-Seller-Negotiator-1) was coded, defining the player payoff functions as the
objective functions to be maximized simultaneously. The body of the code sits
within the command “methods”. The code is then broken up into 3 subsections:
Initialization, Calculation, and Sample Plotting.
3.2.2.1

Initialization

The Initialization section defines the domain of BSN1 where M stands for the
number of objective functions and D stands for the number of decision variables.
In the GUI, the user will assign M , and D to match the values coded in the
MOOP they are looking to explore. The population size, N , will also need to be
assigned by the user in the GUI. Lower and upper bounds are defined for all decision variables using the command obj.Global.lower and obj.Global.upper,
respectively. The buyers offer exists on the interval [0, 1] where 0 is the lower
bound of the decision variable and 1 is the upper bound. Additionally, commission
selection for a realtor looking for a quick sale exists on the interval [0.05, 0.055],
and commission selection for a realtor looking to maximize their commission exists on the interval [0.055, 0.06]. Finally, the encoding has been set to “real” as
opposed to “binary” or “permutation”, since we are exclusively dealing with a
real-valued problem.
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Figure 3.7: Initialization section of the source code for BSN1

3.2.2.2

Calculation

Calculations of the objective functions succeeds initialization. PopDec refers
to the population of the decision variables. This is a vector of values where
each value is a 3-tuple, containing one value for each dimension of the decision
space. The decision variables are the buyer’s offer, PopDec(:,1), the realtor’s low
commission selection, PopDec(:,2), and the realtor’s high commission selection,
PopDec(:,3). Population selection from the decision space occurs over a uniform
distribution.
D

E
PopDec = (xi , yi , zi ), . . . , (xN , yN , yN ) ,
where
PopDec(:,1) = (xi , ..., xN )
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i = 1, ..., N

(3.3)

3.2 Implementation
PopDec(:,2) = (yi , ..., yN )
PopDec(:,3) = (zi , ..., zN )
This vector is then applied to the objective functions, producing an N × 3
number of rows is equal to the size of the population and the number of columns is
equal to the number of objective functions. In the matrix PopObj, PopObj(:,1)
references the seller’s objective function, PopObj(:,2) the buyer’s objective function, and PopObj(:,3) the realtor’s objective function.



f1 (xi , yi , zi )
f2 (xi , yi , zi )
f3 (xi , yi , zi )


..
..
..


PopObj = 
 , i = 1, ..., N
.
.
.


f1 (xN , yN , zN ) f2 (xN , yN , zN ) f3 (xN , yN , zN )
(3.4)
where
PopObj(:,1) = (f1 (xi , yi , zi ), ..., f1 (xN , yN , zN ))
PopObj(:,2) = (f2 (xi , yi , zi ), ..., f2 (xN , yN , zN ))
PopObj(:,3) = (f3 (xi , yi , zi ), ..., f3 (xN , yN , zN ))

Figure 3.8: Calculation section of the source code for BSN1

3.2.2.3

Sample Plotting

The final section of the code creates sample reference points on the Pareto front.
A matrix of values containing all sample points for each objective function is
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constructed. Each column in P corresponds to the exact same column in PopObj.
The exception here is that PopDec is replaced with an interval and step size for
evenly spaced sample points within the interval of the decision variable based
upon the size of the population. For instance,
(obj.Global.lower(:,1):(obj.Global.upper(:,1)-obj.Global.lower(:,1))/(N-1):obj.Global.upper(:,1))

creates a population of sample points in the interval of decision variable one
from the low end to the high end with a step size equal to the range of the
interval divided by one less the population size. Each decision variable, PopDec,
is specified in this way for P(:,1), P(:,2), and P(:,3). It is important to note
that number of columns in P must match the number of columns in PopObj, as
this value specifies the dimensions of the objective space.

Figure 3.9: Sample plotting section of the source code for BSN1
Once coded, the GUI can be accessed and the algorithm to use, problem to
solve, population size, number of objective functions, number of decision variables, and number of evaluations can be specified by the user. From here, results
can be generated for the simultaneously maximized player utilities (see Figure
3.6).
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Experimental Results
4.1

Pareto Front

PlatEMO’s test module was utilized and the appropriate values and options were
selected. NSGA-II was selected for the algorithm dropdown, BSN1 was selected
for the problem dropdown, the population size was initially set to 100, M (the
number of objective functions) was set to 3, D (the number of decisions variables)
was also set to 3, and evaluations was set to 10000 (see Figure 3.6). The resulting
output appears to indicate the Pareto-optimal front is a straight line in objective
space.
In Figure 4.1, the seller’s range of payoffs can be seen along the f1 axis, the
buyer’s along the f2 axis, and the realtor’s along the f3 axis. We can interpret
the Pareto front to indicate an increase in the realtor’s payoff is a reflection of
an increase in the seller’s payoff. Also, as the payoff’s increase for the seller and
realtor, the buyer’s payoff decreases. This is representative of typical market
behavior between the three parties.
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Figure 4.1: Pareto front for BSN1 under NSGA-II using a population
size of 100
However, there appeared to be some scattering of solutions near the top of
the front. To better explore this, the population size and number of evaluations
were increased to 500 and 30000, respectively. This allowed for a larger sample to
be drawn from the decision space and for triple the number of generations to be
evaluated. The evaluating algorithm was also changed from NSGA-II to NSGAIII. The primary difference between these two algorithms is that NSGA-III uses
reference points to maintain diversity among the solutions on the Pareto front.
This allows for a more even distribution of points to better explore the objective
space and the true Pareto front. NSGA-III works particularly well with three or
more objective functions [19]. A comparison of how the two algorithms perform
under the increased parameters can be see in Figure 4.2.
While the difference between the two algorithms is somewhat subtle, NSGAIII provides a more defined border to the Pareto-optimal front. It can now be
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Figure 4.2: A comparison of the Pareto front in objective space using
NSGA-II and NSGA-III
seen that the front, rather than a line, is a thin 2-dimensional pennant in the
objective space. The influence in payoffs between the players still maintains the
same behavior shown using NSGA-II with the smaller population size. To strictly
look at the influence the realtor has on the seller’s payoff, the objective space was
rotated to show a 2-dimensional plane where the x-axis is the seller’s payoff and
the y-axis is the realtor’s payoff. Figure 4.3 can be interpreted by stating that as
the seller’s payoff increases, the range of possible payoffs for the realtor increases.
This could potentially be explained due to the existence of two types of realtor
within the same objective function.
When interpreting player payoffs, it is important to remember that a probability of

1
2

was applied to the player payoffs under the condition that the buyer’s

offer is greater than or equal to the seller’s reserve price and

1
2

for when it is less.

This explains why objective space is truncated to values within the range [0, 0.5]
for the seller’s payoff (f1 ), [−0.25, 0.25] for the buyer’s payoff (f2 ), and [0, 0.03] for
the realtor’s payoff (f3 ). The range for each of these payoffs is half the interval on
which the decision variables lie. For instance, if the realtor chooses a commission
of 6%, they have a 50% chance of achieving this commission and a 50% chance
of gaining nothing depending on whether the buyer’s offer is at very least equal
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Figure 4.3: 2-dimension representation of the Pareto-optimal front
when only considering the seller’s and realtor’s payoffs
to the minimum sale price. Therefore, the expected payoff for the realtor would
result in a 3% commission of the buyer’s offer.
It is also worth noting that the seller cannot receive a payoff less than 0, as he
will always retain the value of his property in a scenario that the sale does not go
through, even if that value is negligible. The realtor cannot receive a payoff less
than 0 either, since they have not monetarily invested in the property outside of
their time. However, the buyer can choose to make an offer over market value,
although still in the fair market interval, in effort to meet the reserve price. This
can be seen in Figures 4.1 and 4.2 as the buyer’s payoff ranges on the interval
[−0.25, 0.25] as opposed to [0, 0.5].
The Pareto set is the population on the Pareto-optimal front projected back
to decision space. This allows the user to identify optimal values for the decision
variables. Figure 4.4 shows the location of each member in the Pareto set in decision space. The buyer’s offer selection can be seen along the f1 axis, the realtor’s
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low commission selection along the f2 axis, and the realtor’s high commission
selection along the f3 axis.

Figure 4.4: The Pareto set mapped to the decision space
From the plot of the decision space in Figure 4.4, it would appear optimality in
player payoffs exists when f2 and f3 are maximized or minimized. This suggests
that the realtor should select the the highest or lowest possible commission rate,
but hardly between those two values. Since we are looking at two different types
of realtors, it would make sense for a realtor looking to for a quick sale to always
select the lowest possible commission rate and a realtor looking to maximize their
profit to select the highest possible commission rate.

4.2

Comparison & Analysis

As was stated in Chapter 2, the results of the extensive game model indicated
that it is within the realtor’s best interest to align their strategy with that of the
seller’s. This is can be seen in the weak sequential equilibrium (equation 2.1). In
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a seller’s market, the seller is assumed to be motivated, suggesting the realtor is
better off to list the property for a quick sale; whereas, in a buyer’s market, the
seller is assumed to be indifferent, suggesting the realtor should list the property
on the higher end of fair market.
The results from the Bayesian game model reiterate those from the extensive
game model. Optimal payoff values exist on a line where the realtor’s payoff
increases in conjunction with the seller’s payoff, and the buyer’s payoff decreases
accordingly. If we assume that a seller, whose payoff is closer to 0, values decreased
market time exposure more than monetary gain, then this should be reflected in
the realtor’s commission selection. A realtor looking to maximize their commission in a market where the seller is motivated would result in a payoff outside
the Pareto front displayed in Figures 4.1 and 4.2. Given the the Pareto-optimal
front consists of all non-dominated payoffs within the objective space, it can be
assumed that the Nash equilibrium for the Bayesian game is located somewhere
on that front. However, the method for finding such a solution is outside the
scope of this project.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions
5.1

Application

The purpose of the models created for this study is to determine what influence
a negotiator has on player payoffs in a buyer-seller game. When studying game
theory, negotiators are rarely addressed/used when considering interactions between a buyer and seller. All negotiations, if any, are typically handled by the two
engaged parties. By adding a vested third party interest to the game, it is made
clear that player payoffs are dependent on how the acting third party aligns their
strategy with those they are mediate for. Assuming alignment is made between
the seller and negotiating party, the seller’s final payoff, at very best, will still be
less than if the third party were not considered, due to the required commission
for the negotiator. This explains the rarity of negotiating parties in buyer-seller
games.
While, this study focuses on the influence of a negotiator in relation to the
real estate market, much of the findings from this research could be generalized to
other such scenarios involving a vested negotiating party receiving some form of
commission. Rationality from the models in this study suggests the realtor to only
have a negative influence on player payoffs, particularly when divergent in their
strategy selection with that of the party they are acting on behalf. By excluding
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the negotiator from a buyer-seller model, the two parties, while still working
with imperfect information, can ensure their strategy is not being neglected by a
negotiating self-interested party.

5.2

Future Study

Random selection for each of the decision variables in the Bayesian model is done
using a uniform distribution. This is the generalized distribution for decision variables within the PlatEMO extension for MATLAB. However, when considering
the realtor, it would make much more sense that there would be a skewed distribution to commission selection based on the type of realtor playing the game.
A beta distribution where the mean, standard deviation, and skew, representative of the type of realtor, would need to be specified. This would allow for the
distribution to define the type of realtor as opposed to the bounds on the interval.

hCmedian i

hCmean i

Figure 5.1: Right-skewed distribution representative of
commission selection for a realtor looking to maximize
their commission
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hCmean i

hCmedian i

Figure 5.2: Left-skewed distribution representative of
commission selection for a realtor looking for a quick sale
The realtor’s commission, c, would exist on a singular interval where the range
of the max and min value of the bounded interval are typical across various
market climates. A realtor with a desire to maximize their commission would
apply a right-skewed distribution to their commission selection where the mean
would, most likely, exceed the median; whereas, a realtor looking for a quick sale
would apply a left-skewed distribution to their commission selection where the
median would, most likely, exceed the mean of the interval.
Expected payoff to the realtor could also be separated into two separate objective functions: one for a realtor looking to maximize their commission and the
other for a realtor looking for a quick sale. This would alter the objective space
from being 3-dimensional to 4-dimensional, Analysis and interpretation would require restricting the output to specific objective functions in order to determine
the effects of one player on another.
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